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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
\~ERDA LYNN d/b/a LYNN
RgALTY, and UKITED FARM
AGI~~NCY, INC., a Utah eorporation,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,
YS.

Case No.
10611

K. C. RANCHES, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Defe11da11t and Apprdlant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMEKT OF FACTS
The facts set forth by appellant in its brief are substantially correct as to the factual matter contained
therein, but conclusions of counsel not support by the
evidence or facts should be disregarded by the Court.
\Vith regards to Exhibit P-2, the Earnest l\Ioney
Receipt and Offer to Purchase, it is significant to note
that following the signing of the Earnest Money Receipt
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and Offer to Purchase by the purchasers jn three different places, the defendant corporation, by and through
its secretary, signed tlw agrePrnent in the place indicated
by appellant in its statement of facts, but in addition
also signed the agreemt>nt on Jim' ±G of Raid agreement
acknowledging receipt of the final copy of the foregoing
agreement bearing all signatures. Likewise this was dated by the defendant. ( R-40)

It is significant to note certain additional facts:
(1) That K. C. Ranches, Inc., transferred the property to Doxey-Layton Company for no consideration
whatsoever after the conunencement of this action. (R18, 19, 51, 52, 53 and 106)
1

(2) That Mary K. Bennett was the only officer and
director of K. C. Ranches, Inc., within the State of Utah
having a legal capacity to contract. (R-37) (R-75)
(3) That at the time of the execution of the listing
agreement, plaintiff's Exhibit P-1, her husband, an officer and one of the three directors of the company, was
incarcerated in the State Hospital at Provo, Utah, (R-36),
and awaiting trial for murder. (R-72)
( 4) That the corporation did not requdiate the execution of the listing agreement or Earnest l\Ioney Receipt and Off er to Purchase by the letter of May 28,
1965, introduced by defendant as Exhihit D 5.
( 5) That Mary K. Bennett consistently refused to
testify under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
of the rnited States as to her personal dealings with
2

K. C. Ranches or with Doxey-Layton Realty and to
whether or not she had emhezzeled money from DoxeyLayton which ·was put into K. C. Ranches, and that being
the reason for the transfer by K. C. Ranches back to
Doxey-Layton of the propert)· in question. (R-53, 105
and 106)
( 6) That at the directors meeting allegedly held
about May 28, 1965, the ::;aid Mary K. Bennett was the
only director present at that meeting, and it was at this
time that the offer was withdrawn. (R-7-!)
(7) That both the agent of United Farm Agency,
Inc., one of the plaintiffs herein, and Yerda Lynn,
testified that they had agreed to accept the commission
payment specified by Mrs. Bennett and K. C. Ranches,
Inc. on Exhibit P-2 on the day or da~· after the execution
of said earnest mone.v receipt and offer to purchase
(R-90, 91, 89 and 99).
(8) That the evidence of plaintiff showed that the
defendant did not advise anyone of its decision to refuse
to go through with the purchase until some time after
the 23rd of May, 1965. (R-80)
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS SUFFICIENT COMPETENT EVIDENCE
IN THE RECORD TO SUPPORT THE COURT'S
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
JUDGMENT.

The court specifically found in its memorandum
decision and its findings of fact and conclusions of law
that the said Mary K. Bennett, the secretary and di rector
of the defendant corporation, executed the listing agreement, plaintiff's exhibit No. P-1, and the Earnest Money
Receipt and Offer to Purchase, plaintiff's Exhibit P-2.
The court further found that she had authority to bind
the corporation and that plaintiff's accepted and agreed
to take the one-half interest in the land being taken as
down payment as their commission. (Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law R-!17, 18 and 19)
It is submitted that the citation of authority for
the proposition that the Supreme Court will not alter
the decision of the Trial Court where tlwre is substantial
evidence to sustain the decision of said court would undulyprolong this brief as the court has so held on many
occasions.
POINT II
l\IARY K. BENNETT, AS SECRETARY AND DIRECTOR OF THE DEFENDANT, BOUND SAID
CORPORATION BY HER ACTIONS.

The record is replete with the undisputed facts that
Mary K. Bennett was the sole officer and director with-
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in the State of Utah of the defendant corporation. Likewise she had ownership of virtually all of the stock of the
corporation, save and exct~pt qualifying shares of her
husband and a l\lr. Black, \Vho resided in Colorado. 'l1he
corporation was merely a shell for the operations of
.Mrs. Bennett. Accordi~g to her own testimony when the
letter of l\lay 28, 1965, Exhibit D-5, was drafted and sent
to the plaintiff, linited Farm Agency, the board of directors meetings of which she mentions in said letter
consisted of merely hen;elf meeting with herself to· decide what she would do. (R-7--1:) It is interesting to note
that the letter of l\lay 28, 1965, did not repudiated the
actions of l\lrs. Bennett in making the listing agreement, and impliedly thereby did not repudiate the execution of tlw Earnest l\lone~· Receipt and Offer to Purchase, and the defense of lack of corporate capacity was
not raised by affirmative pleading in its answer as required by Rule 8 ( c) U.R. C.P.
As the corporation was actually being conducted in
essence as a sole proprietorship by the said l\lary K.
Bennett, it would have been a fruitless and meaningless
act to go through the motions of convening a meeting of
the board of directors for l\lrs. Bennet to conduct a meeting to be attended only by herself for the purposes of
passing a corporate resolution authorizing her to enter
into this Earnest l\loney Reciept and Offer to Purchase.
Appellant quotes the Utah Business Corpo·ration
Act, 16-10-74, as authority for the re<1nirement of a board
meeting and written or printed notice to each- of the
stockholders of the contemplated sale. It is submitted
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that the purpose of this particular section of the Act
is for the pro.tection of the stockholdern and not of persons dealing with the corporation. This is evidenced by
16-10-75 and 16-10-76. Appellant refers to the Articles of
Incorporation of said corporation. rrhese were not put
into evidence by defendant and properly may not now
be referred to. However, as Mary K. Bennett owned
ostensibly 98% of the outstanding shares, such a ratification may be inferred from the fact that she entered
into the contract herself.
Be it as it may, the very conduct which appellanf
now claims to have been in violation of Utah Code, it
followed when it transferred its property to Doxey-Layton for no consideration whatsoever. It is submitted
that the reason for the transfer to Doxey-Layton is because the said Mary K. Bennett, in her personal dealings,
transferred the corporate property to Doxey-Layton as
a means of solving her own difficulties.
As there was ample evidence to sustain the court's
findings, the findings will not be upset except for manifest error.
POINT III
PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR REAL
ESTATE COMMISSION BY REASON OF HAVING
PROCURED A BON A FIDE SALE OF THE PROPERTY LISTED BY DEFENDANT CORPORATION.

The evidence is clear that the plaintiffs found a
buyer ready, willing and able to purchase the land of
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defendant, and that further the plaintiffs had agreed to
accept their commission in the tran~fer to them of an
inh'rl'st in land.
The J£arnest Money Reciept and Offer to Purchase,
Exhibit P-2, between purchaser and seller, was complete
and nothing was left to be done as between them, and
constituted a binding contract. Bunnell ·i;. Bills, 368 P.2d
597, 13 U.2d 83. The document \Vas filleu out and signed
by all parties, and receipt of the final offer was acknowledged by the corporate officer and director, Mary
K. Bennett.
The arrangement between the plaintiffs and seller
was an agreement separate and apart from that between
the purchaser and seller, as the purchasers had no interest and could have no interest in the payment of the commission from the seller to the plaintiffa.
Seller made an offer to the plaintiffs to pay their
commission by the acceptance by them of an interest in
certain land. This offer was accepted by both of the
plaintiffs. Thornton v. Pasch, 139 P.2d 1002, 104 U. 313.
All of the terms and conditions would have been further
reduced to writing (R-92) thereby placing the terms
and conditions at this point partially oral and partially
in writing in one written document. Radley, et al, v.
Smith, et al, 313 P.2d 465, 6 U.2d 304. The mere fact
that the acceptance of the commission terms was oral
is inconsequential. R. J. Daum Construction Co. v. Child,
247 P.2d 817, 112 U. 194.
At no time until the commencement of this action
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did the defendant raise as an issue the acceptance of
the commission in land. This was not the reason for the
withdrawal of the offer to sell the land; and the letter
of May 28, 1965, Exhibit D-5, clearly shows that the reason for the withdrawl of the land from the market was
not the commission basis, but that corporate affairs
would be better served by holding the property. It is
interesting to note that shortly thereafter the property
was conveyed over to DoxPy-Layton. Just how this
better served the corporation is not clear.
It is submited that everything \Vas done that needed
to be done, that Mary K. Bennett had spo·ken with Mr .
.Massey, the agent of the plaintiff United Farm Agency,
Inc. by phone and confirmed the commission arrangement (R-98), and had been further advised by Mrs. Lynn
that the terms of the conunission payment were satisfactory not only to her but as to United Farm Agency
whom she was representing as their agent.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of
the lower court should be sustained.

There is ample and substantial evidence in the record
to sustain the holding of the trial court, and it is respectfully submitted that plaintiffs are entitled to their
commission and the commission is due and payable by
the defendant.
A bona fide contract was entered into, which was
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binding on all parties. The defendant'.;; breach of this
contract has resulted in damages to the plaintiffs, for
which they are entitled to their judgment.
The judgment of the lower court should be affirmed
and the respondents herein awarded their costs.
Respectfully submited,
Paul N. Cotro-Manes of
COTRO-MANES &
COTRO-MANES
430 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Ftah
Attorneys for Respondents
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